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Abstract: 
The recession of 2008-2009 showcased the critical role that the corporate bond market 
plays in providing firms with access to capital, a role reflected by a 300% increase in corporate 
bonds issued from $600 billion issued in 2007 to $1.8 trillion issued in 2012. In this study, I 
investigate the bond specific, firm specific and macroeconomic factors that explain the change in 
corporate credit spreads within the Consumer Staples industry between 2005 and 2013. The 
results show that the firm specific variables, debt and total assets, have the largest impact on the 
corporate credit spreads. However, there is a weaker relationship between the variables and the 
corporate credit spread during recessionary times. 
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1.   Introduction 
 The corporate bond market has been a particularly important source of financing for 
companies around the world for decades. The recession of 2008-2009 showcased the critical role 
that the corporate bond market plays in providing firms with access to capital, a role reflected by 
a 300% increase in corporate bonds issued from $600 billion issued in 2007 to $1.8 trillion 
issued in 2012. Due to this significant increase in corporate bonds issued, a revisiting of the topic 
of factors influencing the corporate bond spreads would contribute to the literature on capital 
markets. 
Investors inherently want to minimize risk while maximizing returns. One way of doing 
this is to leverage their portfolios with a riskless security coupled with a riskier security. Hedge 
fund investors, for example, will leverage corporate bonds in their portfolios by shorting U.S. 
treasuries to hedge away the interest rate risk. This strategy causes changes in corporate credit 
spreads to have an immediate impact on their portfolios as investors need to be cognizant of all 
factors affecting their investment strategies, including investing in investment grade and high 
yield corporate bonds.   
The severity of the recession of 2008-2009 (and the subsequent quantitative easing by the 
United States government) and its effect on the corporate bond market, call for a revisit of the 
topic on the impact of firm specific factors on corporate credit spreads. A sample of large sized 
firms from the Consumer Staples industry is used with a period spanning 2005-2013. 
The results indicate the firm specific factors, debt and size have the largest impact on the 
corporate credit spreads. Additionally, each variable had a different coefficient sign than its 
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interaction variable. This shows that during a time of contraction in the economy, the 
relationship between each of the variables and the corporate credit spread is weaker. 
 To outline the rest of this paper: the literature review will be discussed in Section 2. The 
hypotheses are presented in Section 3. Data and methodology used for the regression will be 
discussed in Section 4. The variables used for the regression will be discussed in this section. In 
Section 5, the results from the regression will be explained and evaluated, and the conclusions 
will be discussed in Section 6.  
2.   Theoretical Determinants of the Corporate Credit Spread  
The factors that influence corporate credit spreads have been extensively researched 
previously, but none of the previous studies include the recession of 2008-2009. The recession 
caused worldwide financial turmoil that ultimately led to a bailout of financial institutions and 
auto companies by the United States government.  
Sargent (1979) explores the rational expectations theory for his study. He states that long-
term yields are a function of current and past short-term interest rates. According to the rational 
expectations theory, economic choices including those from corporations are based on a rational 
outlook of all available information and past experiences. This explains that decisions made by 
corporations are not irrational decisions because of the availability of perfect information. This 
suggests that firm specific factors could influence changes in corporate credit spreads. The 
rational expectations theory represents the underlying theory for my study.  
Fisher (1959) pioneered the research on bond prices and that they are a function of firm 
specific factors such as financial risk. First, he argues that the average risk premiums on a firm’s 
bonds are contingent on the default risk as well as the bond’s marketability. Secondly, the default 
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risk can be predicted by three variables: the coefficient of variation of the firm’s net income over 
the last nine years (after all charges and taxes are included), the length of time the firm has been 
operating without forcing its creditors to take a loss, and the ratio of the market value of the 
equity in the firm to the par value of the firm’s debt. Thirdly, he hypothesizes that the 
marketability of a firm’s bonds can be estimated by a single variable: the market value of all the 
public bonds outstanding. Lastly, a linear function of the logarithms of the variables just listed 
estimate the average risk premium on a firm’s bonds. Fisher’s (1959) paper laid the foundation 
for future research on the topic. For his data, he used only United States industrial firms to avoid 
the industry specific factors and the foreign risks.  
Black-Scholes (1973) in their famous “Black-Scholes Options Pricing Model” use the 
underlying assumption that the rational expectations theory holds true. Their model presents a 
complete general equilibrium theory of option pricing with a formula that has a function of 
“observable” variables. Merton (1975) expands this model as he noted that corporate debt spread 
depends on three things: the required rate of return on riskless debt (i.e., United States T-Bills), 
the various restrictions detailed in the model (i.e., maturity date, etc.), and the probability that the 
firm will default. This model with the underlying assumption of the rational expectations theory 
represents the foundation for future research on pricing theories. 
One of the drawbacks of the Black-Scholes Options Pricing Model is that default is 
assumed to occur only when the firm exhausts its assets. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) 
shows that this aspect of the model implies credit spreads are much smaller than they actually 
are. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) conclude that the Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) 
model appears to have an incremental explanatory power over the naïve model for non-
investment grade bonds, but no explanatory power for investment grade bonds. They also find 
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evidence that introducing stochastic interest rates and taxes would improve the model’s 
performance.  
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) build on Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld’s (1984) model by 
incorporating both default risk and interest rate risk as well as allowing for deviations from strict 
absolute priority. They show that the credit spreads implied by the model are consistent with 
many of the properties of actual credit spreads. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) conclude that 
evidence of a negative relationship for both changes in the short-term interest rates of corporate 
bonds and changes in corporate asset value. This contradicts the traditional approach that credit 
spreads depend only on the risk of default of the issuer. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) also 
conclude that the difference in credit spreads across industries and sectors appear to be related to 
differences in correlations between equity returns and changes in the interest rate. These changes 
in interest rates account for more of the variation in credit spreads for investment grade bonds 
than changes in the value of the assets of the firm. This evidence provides a strong indication that 
both default risk and interest rate risk are necessary components for a valuation model for 
corporate debt.  
 Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin (1999) build on Longstaff and Schwartz’s (1995) 
arguments by investigating the determinants of credit spread changes. They examine how 
changes in credit spreads respond to representations for both changes in the probability of future 
default and for changes in the recovery rate. They observe from a contingent-claims standpoint 
that credit spreads change for two fundamental reasons: there is a risk of default, and the 
bondholder receives only a percentage of the promised payouts in the event of default. Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin (1999) conclude that, in contrast to the predications of structural 
models of default, firm-specific factors appear to have less importance than aggregate factors. 
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This result contrasts previous evidence on firm-specific factors affecting credit spread changes. 
The authors inferred that the large variation of corporate credit spreads of an individual bond can 
be explained by an aggregate factor common to all bonds.  
Helwege and Turner (1999) investigate the yield curves of riskier firms or speculative 
grade firms. They cite the work by Merton (1974) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) that 
predicted upward sloping yield curves for investment grade corporate issuers and a downward 
sloping or a hump-shaped yield curve for speculative grade firms. They conclude that, contrary 
to many bond pricing models, there was no indication that a downward sloping yield curve exists 
for speculative grade firms. Helwege and Turner (1999) suggest that researchers should be 
careful when choosing values for their models that may result only on a downward sloping yield 
curve for speculative grade firms. Those researchers should instead choose parameters for 
leverage and firm specific risk which represent actual risk in the bond market.  
Tang and Yan (2006) address several of the puzzles related to previous research. The first 
issue is how the magnitude of corporate credit spreads predicted by theoretical models was 
inconsistent with historical observations. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) show that credit 
spreads predicted by structural models are significantly lower than the observed levels, 
especially for investment grade bonds. Secondly, the predicted shape of the credit yield spread 
curve for high yield bonds is lower than historical observations. Helwege and Turner (1999) 
argue that an upward yield spread curve for speculative grade corporate bonds contradicts Black-
Scholes (1973) and Merton’s (1974) model. The third issue is that some fundamental 
determinants of corporate credit spreads continue to be indefinable. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, 
& Martin (1999) exhibit that in contrast to the predications of structural models of default; firm-
specific factors appear to have less importance than aggregate factors. Tang and Yan (2006) find 
8 
  
that their model, which has an emphasis on macroeconomic conditions, show equal results for 
corporate credit spreads of both investment grade and speculative grade bonds. Their model also 
generates an upward sloping yield curve for speculative grade firms just like that of Helwege and 
Turner (1999). Tang and Yan (2006) also suggest that macroeconomic variables can describe a 
substantial portion of yield spread changes. They conclude that macroeconomic factors could 
potentially offer a clue to the missing factor of corporate bond valuation originally inferred by 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin (1999).  
3.   Hypothesis 
This section presents the testable hypotheses for each variable of interest. Table 1 in the 
Appendix shows all of the variables that will be used in the regression as well as predicted sign 
of their relationship and a short definition of the variable. The variables are classified into three 
different categories: bond specific factors, firm specific factors and macroeconomics factors. 
Bond specific 
 Liquidity - Amihud and Mendleson (1991) argue that bond risk premiums 
should be higher for those bonds that cannot be easily sold or exchanged for cash without a 
substantial loss in value, i.e. illiquid bonds.  
Bao, Pan, Wang (2011) also looked at the impact of liquidity in the corporate bond 
market on bond valuation. They examined the pricing impact of illiquidity in corporate bonds at 
the individual bond level and the aggregate level. They found that illiquidity increases with a 
bond’s age and maturity, but decreases with its issuance size. Bao, Pan, Wang (2011) also 
concluded that bond illiquidity fluctuates substantially over time especially during economic 
turmoil. Based on this evidence, I expect a negative relationship between the liquidity of the 
bond and changes in corporate credit spreads.  
I hypothesize that bonds with a higher liquidity have lower spreads.  
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Maturity- Amihud and Mendleson (1991) state that the longer the time to 
maturity of a bond is, the higher its risk premium should be due to the asset not being easily sold 
or exchanged for cash without a substantial loss in value. Gkougkousi (2013) also argues that the 
aggregate earnings-returns relation is lower for bonds with higher credit ratings and longer 
maturities. This suggests that firms that issue bonds with a longer maturity date will be less 
affected by changes in corporate credit spreads implying a positive relationship exists between 
the time to maturity of a bond and changes in corporate credit spreads.  
I hypothesize that bonds with longer maturities have higher spreads. 
Firm specific 
 Profits-  Bai and Wu (2012) states that higher profitability reduce the 
corporate credit spread. They claim that lower or even negative earnings often lead to a much 
wider corporate credit spreads due to the inherent risk of an investment in a firm with negative 
profits.  Grabowski and King (2000) also find that firms with higher operating profit margins, or 
other measures of profitability, are seen by investors as less risky due to their lower rates of 
returns. This means that firms with higher profits should have a narrower credit spread.  
I hypothesize that more profitable firms will have lower spreads. 
 Debt-  Flannery, Nikolova, & Öztekin (2012) test whether investors’ 
expectations for future debt or leverage of a firm affects the observed corporate bond credit 
spreads. Their results indicate that expected increases in future leverage will be reflected in 
higher credit spreads. This shows that when investors expect the debt of a firm to increase, the 
corporate credit spread should increase as well.  
I hypothesize that firms with lower debt will have lower spreads. 
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 Size-  Fama and French (1993) argue that small firms can suffer long 
earnings depressions that do not affect large firms. This suggests that size might explain the 
negative relationship between size and future returns as smaller firms often require larger 
coverage ratios for the same credit rating as larger firms. Paschall and Hawkins (1999) state that 
because smaller firms are generally accepted as riskier than larger firms, investors demand a 
higher risk premium which means smaller firms have higher corporate credit spreads.  
I hypothesize that larger sized firms will have lower spreads. 
Macroeconomic factors 
GDP growth rate-  Tang and Yan (2006) find in their studies that 
macroeconomic variables can explain a substantial portion of corporate credit spread changes. 
The gap between the corporate yields and United States T-Bill yields narrows creating an inverse 
relationship between the GDP growth rate and corporate credit spreads.  
I hypothesize that the larger the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate is, the lower 
the spread will be. 
VIX-   Nieto, Novales, & Rubio (2013) argue that the VIX is a key 
determinant of the long-run component of volatility for corporate bonds. For high-rating bonds, 
including the VIX improves the statistical model even during economic times of recession and 
expansion. Lin (2013) also argues that investors can use the VIX to track the movement of the 
SPX option implied volatility. This means that the VIX can be used as a measure of the market’s 
future riskiness. When risk throughout the market is expected to increase, the VIX increases. 
This would mean that corporate credit spreads should increase due to the riskiness. This indicates 
a positive relationship should exist between the VIX and corporate credit spreads.  
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I hypothesize that the larger the Volatility Index (VIX) is, the lower the spread 
will be. 
4.   Data 
In this study, I classify the factors explaining the corporate credit spreads into three 
sections: bond specific factors, firm specific factors and macroeconomic factors. Bond specific 
factors include liquidity of bonds (log of volume traded in millions), and maturity of the bonds 
(quarters until the maturity date). Firm specific factors include size (log of total assets), profits 
(return on assets), and debt (total debt outstanding divided by total assets).  The macroeconomic 
factors are the real GDP growth rate and the Volatility Index (VIX). These variables are a 
function of the corporate credit spreads, as measured by the last price (spread to benchmark as 
defined by Bloomberg) on a given day at quarter end. Table 1 in the Appendix shows all of the 
variables including a short definition and their predicted signs. I also added an interaction 
variable for each of the listed variables to help account for the 2008-2009 recession. I multiplied 
each variable by the number 1 for each observation that occurred in either 2008 or 2009 (so 8 
observations total). Then I multiplied each variable by the number 0 for each observation that did 
not occur in either 2008 or 2009. This created an indicator variable which should help account 
for the 2008-2009 recession. 
The data series for this study was compiled from the Bloomberg database via a 
COUNTRY Financial Bloomberg terminal. The dataset for this panel data research includes 24 
publically traded firms in the Consumer Staples industry create. Table 2 in the Appendix lists all 
24 firms, their tickers, market capitalization (cap) in billions, CUSIP of their bonds, and the 
maturity date of their bonds. I use quarterly data with a range of December 2005 to December 
2013 (32 observations per variable or 766 total observations). All of the bonds selected for this 
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sample are investment grade bonds. Table 3 in the Appendix shows each sampled firm 
categorized by its sub-industry within the Consumer Staples industry. Total and average market 
capitalization of the firms is shown. The data was selected based on the availability of historical 
spread data, so the majority of firms are large-cap and mid-cap sized firms with only one small-
cap firm included. The transformation of the data included taking the logarithm of total assets 
and volume traded to induce linearity. 
Table 4 in the Appendix shows some summary statistics for all of the non-dummy 
variables. The mean, median, minimum, and maximum values are shown in the table for both the 
entire sample as well as the values just included in the 2008-2009 recession. All of the bond 
specific and firm specific variables show little variation between the entire sample and the values 
during the 2008-2009 recession. However, the dependent variable and the macroeconomic 
variables show great difference between the entire sample and just the values of the 2008-2009 
recession. The mean of the spread increases 28% in value while the maximum value of the entire 
sample is set in the years of 2008-2009 (617.5090). The mean of the VIX shows an increase of 
31% while the GDP growth rate shows a decrease of 133%. This means that expectations of 
riskiness of the market grew significantly during the 2008-2009 recession while the economy 
contracted considerably. These measures show the need to add the interaction variables to 
account for the 2008-2009 recession. 
One limitation of the data is the focus on the large market capitalization of all of the 
firms. Ideally, different market capitalizations should equally be represented in the sample but 
due to the availability of historical bond spreads, the majority of firms in the dataset are large-
cap or mid-cap sized firms. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows market capitalization of the S&P 
500 Consumer Staples plotted with the market caps of the sampled firms. The two market 
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capitalization lines follow the same trend until the 2008-2009 recession where a separation of the 
two lines starts to occur.  
For the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the equation used to determine the 
effects of bond specific, firm specific and macroeconomic factors on the corporate credit spreads 
is: 
Corporate Credit Spread
 t = α  
+ β(VIX)  
+ β(Volume traded) + β(Volume traded Dummy)  
+ β(Quarters until maturity) + β(Quarters until maturity Dummy)  
+ β(Return on assets) + β(Return on assets Dummy)  
+ β(Debt) + β(Debt times Dummy)  
+ β(Total assets) + β(Total assets Dummy)  
+ β(GDP growth rate) + β(GDP growth rate Dummy)  
+ ε(t) 
5.   Results 
Table 5 in the Appendix shows the regression results. The table shows the results of two 
regressions: one without the VIX included as an independent variable and one with the VIX 
included.  Due to the VIX being a very similar variable to the interaction variables, both results 
are shown. Including the VIX in the regression yields better results so that is the main results. 
The macroeconomic factors had the expected impact as the VIX was statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient of 2.1137. An increase in the coefficient results in an 
increase in the corporate credit spread. Although the GDP growth rate is statistically 
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insignificant, its interaction variable has a coefficient of -33.6096. This means that during the 
years of the 2008-2009 recession, a 1% decrease of the GDP growth rate would have caused 
corporate credit spreads to increase by 33.609% (from its total sampled amount).  
Among the bond specific factors, the maturity variable was statistically significant with a 
positive coefficient of 0.2402. This means that a 10% increase in the number of quarters until a 
particular bond matures will cause the corporate credit spread to increase by 2.402%. 
Interestedly, the sign of the coefficient is negative for the interaction variable. This shows that 
during times of contractions in the economy, shorter duration bonds are riskier than longer 
duration bonds.  
For the firm specific factors, debt and total assets were statistically significant. The debt 
had a positive coefficient of 20.578 meaning a 1% increase in a firm’s debt will cause the 
corporate credit spread to increase by 20.578%. Total assets had a negative coefficient of -21.187 
meaning a 1% decrease in a firm’s size will cause the corporate credit spread to increase by 
21.187%. Both results are consistent with previous evidence as firms with larger debt should be 
seen as riskier with a wider corporate credit spread while larger firms should be seen as less risky 
so they will have a narrower corporate credit spread. Just like with the bond specific factors, all 
three variables’ coefficient signs changed during times of contraction in the economy.  
The change of the sign of the interaction variables does not mean a total switch of signs 
during times of recession, rather the variables’ relationship with the corporate credit spread is 
weaker during times of contraction in the economy. 
The r-squared is 0.3316 which reflects the overall goodness of fit for this regression. The 
F-statistic is 28.6949 and is statistically significant which shows that the model fits the 
population of the sampled data well. 
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6.   Conclusions 
In this paper, I employ an OLS regression on a sample of quarterly data obtained from 
the Bloomberg Database with a range of December 2005 to September 2013. The dependent 
variable is the corporate credit spread as defined as last price on a given day at quarter end with 
the independent variables being separated into three sections: bond specific, firm specific, and 
macroeconomic factors. The bond specific variables include liquidity of bonds (volume traded in 
millions), and maturity of the bonds (quarters until the maturity date). Firm specific factors 
include size (log of total assets), profits (return on assets), and debt (total debt outstanding 
divided by total assets).  The macroeconomic factors are the real GDP growth rate and the 
Volatility Index (VIX).  Interaction variables were also introduced to take into account the 2008-
2009 recession.  
Of the variables, the VIX with a 2.1137 coefficient, quarters to maturity with a 0.2402 
coefficient, debt with a 20.5758 coefficient, total assets with a -21.1873, and GDP growth rate’s 
interaction variable with a -33.6096 coefficient were all statistically significant. Interestedly 
enough, all of the variables that included an interaction variable, had a different coefficient sign 
than their interaction variable. This shows that during a time of contraction in the economy, each 
of these variables has a weaker relationship with the corporate credit spread. Due to debt’s and 
total asset’s large coefficient, these two firm specific factors could help explain the corporate 
credit spread a little better than most other variables. 
Future avenues of research should include a sample of firms from a cyclical different 
industry to see if a difference may exist from industry to industry. Also, future research should 
try to get an equal representation of large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap sized firms.  
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Investors could possibly modify their bond management strategies when it comes to 
buying and selling bonds due to this study. Due to relationships between debt and total assets 
with the corporate credit spread, investors could examine a firm’s debt and size of total assets 
before they buy or sell bonds. Now, the results of this paper do not simply state that an investor 
should always examine just a firm’s debt and total assets before deciding whether to buy or sell a 
particular bond. Rather, this paper shows that debt and total assets of a firm are a good indicator 
of a firm’s riskiness as shown in their corporate credit spread.  
Another interesting finding of this paper was what the interaction variables showed. 
When corporate credit spreads begin to change, observations of all of these variables, including 
changes in the sign of the coefficients, could help add evidence to arguments that a recession or 
boom of the economy could occur.  
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Appendix: 
Table 1: Explanation of variables 
  Name 
Predicted 
sign Definition 
Dependent Spread   Difference in bond yield and U.S. treasury yield with same date to maturity. 
Bond 
Specific 
Liquidity Negative Volume traded of particular bond expressed in 
millions. 
Maturity Positive Number of quarters until particular bond 
matures. 
Firm 
Specific 
Profits Negative Return on assets of firm. 
Debt Positive Total debt outstanding divided by total assets. 
Size Negative Total assets expressed in logarithms. 
Macro-
economic 
GDP growth 
rate Negative 
Real GDP growth rate expressed as a 
percentage and adjusted for inflation. 
VIX  Positive Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX). 
Dummy Interaction 
Variable    
Interaction variable for each variable to 
account for 2008-2009 recession. 
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Table 2: Firms 
Name Ticker Market Cap (in billions) CUSIP 
Date of 
maturity 
The Coca-Cola Company KO  167.95 191219ayo 11/15/2026 
Pepsico, Inc. PEP  121.9 713409ac4 3/1/2029 
Mondelez International Inc. MDLZ  59.28 50075nac8 11/1/2031 
Kellogg Company K  21.94 487836at5 4/1/2031 
Hershey Co HSY  23.63 427866al2 8/15/2027 
ConAgra Foods, Inc. CAG  11.93 205887ar3 10/1/2028 
Campbell Soup Company CPB  13.55 134429ag4 5/1/2021 
The Procter & Gamble 
Company PG  210.08 742718cb3 2/1/2034 
Colgate-Palmolive Company CL  57.18 19416qce8 6/16/2028 
Kimberly Clark Corp KMB  41.37 494368as2 1/1/2028 
Estee Lauder Companies Inc EL  26.55 29736raa8 10/15/2033 
E I Du Pont De Nemours And 
Co DD  61.13 263534bg3 1/15/2028 
Altria Group Inc MO  72.64 718154cf2 1/15/2027 
Tyson Foods, Inc. TSN  13.2 902494ad5 1/15/2028 
Avon Products, Inc. AVP  6.53 054303ar3 7/15/2018 
Hillshire Brands Co HSH  4.59 803111am5 11/1/2032 
Bunge Ltd BG  11.57 120568al4 4/15/2014 
Dean Foods Co DF  1.4 242361ab9 10/15/2017 
Archer Daniels Midland 
Company ADM  26.26 039483ah5 4/15/2017 
CVS Caremark Corporation CVS  85.83 126650av2 9/15/2014 
Safeway Inc. SWY  8.76 786514ba6 2/1/2031 
SYSCO Corporation SYY  21.06 871829af4 8/1/2028 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. WMT  240.3 931142bf9 2/15/2030 
Kroger Company KR  21.66 501044bz3 4/1/2031 
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Table 3: Sub-Industries 
Sub-Industry Total Market Cap Average Market Cap 
Food Processing (10) 187.35 18.735 
Personal & Household (5) 341.71 68.342 
Beverages (2) 289.85 144.925 
Tobacco (1) 72.64 72.64 
Other (6) 417.08 83.416 
 
 
Figure 1: Market Cap (S&P 500 Consumer Staples vs. Sampled Firms) 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
    Sample 2008-2009 
Spread Mean 153.6293 214.4577 
Median 127.5568 196.0689 
Minimum -0.6937 49.8479 
Maximum 617.5090 617.5090 
VIX Mean 21.3714 30.8413 
Median 17.7400 25.9800 
Minimum 11.3900 21.6800 
Maximum 44.1400 44.1400 
Volume Mean 8.0375 7.9216 
Median 7.9542 7.8603 
Minimum 6.0000 6.0000 
Maximum 10.4419 10.1761 
Quarters to 
Maturity 
Mean 68.4410 71.3551 
Median 74.8278 78.0500 
Minimum 2.1889 17.4000 
Maximum 114.0000 104.8667 
Return on 
Assets 
Mean 8.1972 8.2995 
Median 8.2941 8.2083 
Minimum -22.9819 -6.7646 
Maximum 26.9388 26.9388 
Debt Mean 0.4263 0.4224 
Median 0.3019 0.3009 
Minimum 0.0428 0.0428 
Maximum 3.1856 3.0700 
Total Assets Mean 4.3024 4.2875 
Median 4.2222 4.2438 
Minimum 3.3863 3.5433 
Maximum 5.3220 5.2368 
GDP growth 
rate 
Mean 0.3298 -0.2472 
Median 0.3955 0.1059 
Minimum -2.1517 -2.1517 
  Maximum 1.2135 0.9561 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Spread 
C 218.6759*** 168.6778*** 
6.7636 5.1357 
VIX 2.1137*** 
4.503 
Volume -1.8656 -0.0772 
-0.6076 -0.0255 
Volume Dummy -0.7338 -2.6042 
-0.1374 -0.4970 
Quarters to Maturity 0.178 0.2402** 
1.5264 2.0943 
Quarters to Maturity Dummy -0.1919 -0.2585 
-0.7900 -1.0855 
Return on Assets -0.4834 -0.5087 
-0.8584 -0.9223 
Return on Assets Dummy 0.0713 0.1964 
0.0640 0.1802 
Debt 21.1777*** 20.5783*** 
3.9281 3.8962 
Debt Dummy -12.8865 -13.1360 
-1.1625 -1.2098 
Total Assets -20.4654*** -21.1873*** 
-3.3813 -3.5732 
Total Assets Dummy 21.5848** 19.5715*** 
2.1495 1.9886 
GDP Growth Rate 1.3390 -5.5393 
0.2075 -0.8610 
GDP Growth Rate Dummy -51.9719*** -33.6096*** 
  -6.2851 -3.8594 
Observations 766 766 
R-squared 0.3023 0.3316 
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